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I. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO SUE FOR THE REAL 
ESTATE BROKER COMMISSION. 
a. Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments. 
In his opening brief, Schvaneveldt argued that the Plaintiffs lacked standing 
to bring an action to enforce the FSBO agreement. Only a principal broker can 
seek a real estate commission, and none of the Plaintiffs were or had been a 
principal broker. Indeed, a stranger to the transaction and the lawsuit, Dale 
~ Quinlan, was the licensed broker and owner of the dba ReMax Elite (the only 
enumerated party to the FSBO). The issue of standing was raised early in the 
proceedings, and thus Schvaneveldt argued that this issue should be reviewed for 
correctness. 
In response, the Plaintiffs begin by challenging the standard of review. 
Because a portion of the evidence raised to support Schvaneveldt' s standing 
argument was offered after trial, Plaintiffs argue that a JNOV post-trial standard of 
review should be employed. Plaintiffs next contend that the assumed name statute 
does not bar them from pursuing the action, and that any failure to comply with the 
statute may still be cured. Plaintiffs finally contend that their due process rights 
would be violated were the Quinlan and Department of Commerce evidence relied 
upon to deny standing. 
1 
b. Tlie District Court's Standing Conclusion Should be Reviewed for 
Correctness. 
As noted, Plaintiffs contend that the evidence concemmg Quinlan's 
ownership of the dba ReMax/Elite was raised, in part, post-trial, and thus is subject 
to a heightened standard of review. That argument fails. The evidence 
demonstrates that the acquisition of the dba by Still Standing Stables, LLC has 
mooted the issue of whether Plaintiffs have standing. The matter is conclusively 
resolved, inasmuch as Still Standing's acquisition of the dba indisputedly and 
finally merges any standing that Plaintiffs may claim to purse the commission. 
The acquisition of the dba is claimed by Plaintiffs to be somehow 
inappropriate. However, the acquisition of a judgment or enforcement rights by 
one entitled to enforce them is routine. See, e.g., Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond 
Holdings, 2013 UT App 32, 122, 296 P.3d 780 (cited by Schvaneveldt in his brief 
p. 39). The effect of such an acquisition is to effect a merger of the claimant with 
the claimee, thus rendering further prosecution of the claim moot. There is nothing 
inappropriate in Still Standing's acquisition of the dba. Indeed, to protect its 
rights, Still Standing could be expected to do no less than acquire the dba if it was 
available. It is incorrect to employ a heightened standard of review on the 
2 
application of law to facts that moot an issue. Issues of mootness are reviewed for 
correctness. Tillotson v. Meerkerk, 2015 UT App 142, 15, --- P.3d. ---.1 
The proper standard of review on this issue is, therefore, correctness, either 
@ under the standard of review for mootness or for standing in general. Jones v. 
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ~10, 154 P.3d 808. It is thus inappropriate to make the series 
of inferences and leaps suggested by Plaintiffs in their discussion of the evidence 
surrounding standing. It is also improper for Plaintiffs to criticize Schvaneveldt for 
failing to raise the standing issue in trial testimony, since the district court had 
already ruled against Schvaneveldt's attempts to challenge standing and the 
assignments mooting the standing issue had not yet occurred. In this respect any 
contention that the standing argument was abandoned, Response Brief p. 23, is 
incorrect. 
1 Plaintiffs rely on Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ~15, 228 P.3d 747, 
a case dealing with agency review of an action where future injury was alleged in a 
pleading. The Utah Supreme Court was very specific that it was addressing the 
nature of future injury in the context of pleadings, and whether simply pleading a 
future injury was sufficient to establish standing. The court used limiting 
language in its ruling, stating that it was addressing the proper standard of review 
in "future injury cases." Brown ~19. This conclusion is bolstered by Brown's 
express reliance on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), a case in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the standing requirements 
for environmental litigants whose actual injury had not yet materialized. 
This is not a future injury case. Schvaneveldt's injury--being subject to a 
claim by one not authorized to bring it--is fully realized. The district court 
acknowledged this by ruling at one point, in Schvaneveldt's favor, that Shea lacked 
standing to claim a commission because Shea was not a broker. R. 1885. 
3 
c. Plaintiffs Are Not, and Never Have Been, Compliant With the 
Registered Nanie Statute. 
Plaintiffs argue that Aspenwood did not need to properly register the ReMax 
Elite dba since neither it nor Wing, who claims to be retired, conduct business any 
longer. Plaintiffs' theory is that even though the dba needed to be registered to 
conduct business, it did not need to be registered to collect a commission in court. 
Moreover, they argue, as long as the dba was registered with someone ( even 
Quinlan or Still Standing, presumably), this was sufficient for technical 
compliance with the statute. 
Plaintiffs concede that they did not properly register and maintain the dba, 
but that this failure was essentially excusable. They cite no case law for this, but 
rather rely on a strained reading of the statute. It is impossible to reconcile this 
view with the statute's clear intent. Citing to the Plaintiffs' notice-to-the-public 
argument, it is difficult to see how the public is served by consulting a dba 
registration pointing to someone wholly unrelated to whom they are doing 
business. Expounding by analogy, if a consumer were doing business with a dba 
Smith Chevrolet, which was registered to Hyundai Motor Corporation but was 
actually operated by General Motors, the consumer is not properly served and 
protected from deception. 
Apart from the counterintuitive nature of Plaintiffs' argument, the record 
demonstrates, through the Quinlan and other evidence, that the Plaintiffs' claimed 
4 
ownership of the dba through their purported transfer from Quinlan was void ab 
initio. This in and of itself unhinges Plaintiffs' already overstretched argument for 
compliance. 
d. The Registered Name Statute Does Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Now 
"Cure" Their Failure to Comply. 
Plaintiffs next attempt to create an environment in which they can cure their 
noncompliance. None of what they argue on this point comes from the record. 
Rather, it is offered as a hypothetical future way forward. As such, it is 
~ inappropriate to raise it now before this Court. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite no cases 
or other authority indicating that the statute authorizes the type of nunc pro tune 
cure they advocate. 
As for the substance of the Plaintiffs' arguments, they first question the 
assignment to Still Standing, the legitimacy of which has already been established. 
Supra pp. 2-3. Adding to that discussion, it is appropriate under any reading of 
the statute to have an entity or individual own a dba as long as they have a 
common interest, and, accordingly, common responsibility to the consumer. 
Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge this reality. 
Plaintiffs then cite to ReMax corporate policy (again, not in the record) 
prohibiting dbas using the ReMax name without corporate permission. This 
extrarecord contention should not be considered. 
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e. Due Process is Not Violated When One is Denied Discovery When 
One Wins at the Outset in a Summary Ruling. 
Finally, Plaintiffs raise a series of policy and due process arguments 
concerning the Quinlan evidence. Plaintiffs make a glaring omission in their 
contentions: they did not have an opportunity to test the evidence or to conduct 
discovery because the district court dismissed the arguments on which the evidence 
was based as a matter of law. One does not suffer a denial of due process when 
one is granted the very relief one seeks. 
II. THE COMMISSION IS NOT OWED BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS 
OF THE FSBO CONTRACT WERE NOT SATISFIED. 
a. Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments. 
Schvaneveldt' s second argument was that default of the seller was required 
in order for a commission to be owing. There was no basis, as a matter of law, to 
conclude that the seller had defaulted as a matter of law. Moreover, if the 
Plaintiffs only had to show that there was a ready, willing and able buyer, issues of 
fact surrounding this standard prevented a conclusion as a matter of law that this 
condition had been satisfied. 
Plaintiffs argue in response that the FSBO only required one condition: that 
Schvaneveldt accept an offer from the Buyer, with no dependence on subsequent 
performance by buyer or seller. Plaintiffs rely on a Utah Supreme Court case, 
Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 
6 
P.3d 292, for their argument that a closing need not actually occur (and no 
proceeds need exchange hands) for a commission to be paid. Plaintiffs contend 
that the agreement here and that in Fairbourn were "slightly different," but not 
-.i; materially so. The need to record closing documents and for the commission be 
payable from proceeds of the sale did not, Plaintiffs argue, change the requiremep.t 
that a commission be paid. They also argue that Schvaneveldt caused the sale to 
fail by not providing a general warranty deed, and that the REPC called for 
financing (not cash). They conclude that no issues of fact surrounded whether a 
ready, willing and able buyer was produced, and therefore summary judgment was 
properly granted. 
b. Plaintiffs Ignore the Crucial Language in the FSBO That Seller 
Default Must Occur in Order for the Commission to be Due and 
Owing. 
Plaintiffs' argument purports to rely on the language of the FSBO and on 
Fairbourn, but it largely ignores key contractual language, and how that language 
~ distinguishes the contract in Fairbourn. Plaintiffs omit from their block quote of 
the FSBO an important follow-on sentence: 
"The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be due and payable 
from the proceeds of the Seller on the date of recording of closing 
documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the Buyer 
or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is 
prevented by default of the Seller the Brokerage Fee shall 
immediately be due and payable to the Conipany." 
R. 6351. Schvaneveldt raised the requirement of seller default in his brief, 
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contending that it was not established as matter of law. Plaintiffs have ignored it, 
instead simply rehashing the same argument they made below. They have also 
erected a straw man, claiming that Schvaneveldt contends that payment of the 
commission is absolutely conditioned upon closing and exchange of funds ( a 
condition weakened by Fairbourn). But Schvaneveldt does not contend that actual 
closing and exchange of funds was required for the commission to be payable. 
Rather, he has consistently maintained that Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate seller 
default, something that in the court below, and in their response, they have failed to 
do. 
The contractual language requiring seller default is expressly clear. The 
Utah Supreme Court in recent years has reiterated the principle that a contract is a 
contract. For example, in Commercial Real Estate Inv. v. Comcast of Utah II, 
Inc., 2012 UT 49, iJiJ38-40, 285 P.3d 1193, the court reviewed a liquidated 
damages clause. It refused to constiue that clause in a manner more strict than it 
would construe other provisions of the contract. The court refused to apply 
different policy standards to different language within the same instrument. 
Nothing in Fairbourn suggests that the court wquld treat this FSBO any 
differently. The commission language in the FSBO is expressly conditioned on 
8 
seller default, language that was not in the Fairbourn contract.2 Ignoring that 
provision commits the very error eschewed by Plaintiffs-inconsistently giving 
effect to some contractual provisions at the expense of others. And if there is any 
@ ambiguity arising out of ensuring such uniform consistency, the ambiguity should 
be resolved against Plaintiffs as the drafter of the FSBO under the doctrine of 
contra proferentem. 
c. Plaintiffs Misstate the Materiality of the Need for the Transaction to 
be Cash, and Ignore the Factual Disputes Surrounding that 
Material Condition. 
Plaintiffs argue that Schvaneveldt refused to pay the commission because he 
believed the transaction was cash, and the cash nature of the transaction was not 
fulfilled. This misstates Schvaneveldt' s argument. As noted already, 
Schvaneveldt's true contention is that buyer's failing to close on the deal, 
IJ combined with the seller not being in default, prevented the conditions precedent 
for commission payment from being fulfilled. 
Plaintiffs compound their misstatement of Schvaneveldt's core contention 
by claiming that the difference between a cash and financed transaction could not 
2 Even if seller default were an implied, and not express, condition of the 
commission's being payable, this would not change the analysis. This Court in the 
lower Fairbourn ruling implied a condition that was left undisturbed by the Utah 
Supreme Court on certiorari. If the Utah Supreme Court were really disposed to 
reject the possibility of implied conditions in contracts, it would have so ruled. 
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be material. This defies reason. A cash transaction is far less fraught with 
potential transactional impediments. This is why cash sales often fetch a lower 
purchase price.3 In any event, the majority of points Plaintiffs raise with respect to 
Schvaneveldt's expectation of a cash deal are jury arguments and are thus 
inappropriate. Plaintiffs have the burden at summary judgment to demonstrate 
that there are no material issues of fact. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 110, 177 
P.3d 600. Their narrative shows not only that they have not complied with that 
burden; they have abandoned it. 
d. There Are Significant Fact Disputes Concerning Whether There 
was a Seller Default, and Plaintiffs Misstate When Contending that 
the District Court Ruled That Failure to Provide a General 
Warranty Deed Constituted Seller Default. Insurance, not a Deed, 
was the True Issue. 
While the Plaintiffs at no time in their brief acknowledge or address the 
requirement that seller default be a condition for commission payment, they finally 
do obliquely discuss it when asserting the Schvaneveldt did indeed default. 
Appellees' Brief p. 39. But Plaintiffs argument, again, missed the mark. They 
contend that Schvaneveldt was obligated to provide a general warranty deed to 
3 Plaintiffs' vision of suitcases of cash is naive. A "cash" transaction has nothing 
to do with specie. Rather, it simply means that the buyer himself has in hand the 
purchase funds, rather than needing to rely on third-party funding, with its 
attendant transactional friction. 
10 
comply with the REPC. Having failed to do so, they contend, amounted to seller 
default. 
This argument is incorrect, for two reasons. First, it confuses the notion of 
~ marketable title with that of access. Schvaneveldt addressed this in detail in his 
initial brief, and that a general warranty deed was not required in order to furnish 
marketable title. Second, and more significant, Plaintiffs' attempt to bolster this 
argument by citing to the district court falls flat because the court did not rule that 
failure to provide a general warranty deed was a seller breach. Instead, it stated 
that buyers had waived the general warranty deed condition. The district court 
ruled that the true issue was whether the seller could provide insurance on access 
to the property (it ruled that seller could not). R. 5049-50; R. 8384 pp. 72-73. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on any ruling issued by the district court to support 
:..;; their argument. 
Significantly, in their motion for summary judgment on this issue, Plaintiffs 
..;j) did not contend that failure to provide a general warranty deed was the basis for 
seller default. R. 1511-23. This argument has thus only come to fruition on 
appeal, and is inconsistent both the district court's rulings and the Plaintiffs' 
posture below. R. 1521 (to the question of whether the closing never occurred, or 
that seller never breached, Plaintiffs' "response is 'So what?"'). The failure to 
invoke the general warranty deed argument makes sense when considering that 
11 
there is nothing in the record reflecting any demand or objection from the buyer 
concerning a general warranty deed, or to the escrow instructions. Buyer simply 
missed the closing. 
e. Factual Issues Surrounded Whether Plaintiffs Provided a Ready, 
Willing and Able Buyer. 
Plaintiffs argue that they provided a ready, willing and able buyer, which 
was sufficient to trigger the commission provision. Plaintiffs ignore that the 
contract imposed more than this requirement-it required that the Plaintiffs 
demonstrate seller default. Setting this aside arguendo, however, Plaintiffs have 
not addressed Schvaneveldt's point, made in his brief at pp. 47-50, that factual 
issues surrounded whether the buyer was ready, willing and able to proceed. One 
of the most striking examples of such disputed facts is that Still Standing Stables 
contended that it never saw "TBD" in paragraph two of the REPC ( a material 
. terms concerning new loan money); Schvaneveldt contended that Shea modified 
the REPC after the fact. R. 4290-99. No default could occur when the agreement 
the seller was "agreeing" to was not what it saw. 
When Plaintiffs they contend that there was "no dispute" surrounding 
evidence introduced at trial that the buyer was ready, willing and able, they ignore 
the fact that summary judgment on this issue had already been granted. Because 
of this, evidence touching upon it could not be challenged at trial, even though 
12 
disputes concerning it were myriad. The true focus, then, must be on the factual 
disputes surrounding the initial grant of summary judgment on the buyer's status. 
III. SCHY ANEVELDT CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR 
PAYMENT OF THE COMMISSION. 
a. Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments. 
Schvaneveldt' s final argument was that he could not be personally liable 
under the FSBO because of the provisions of the Utah Limited Liability Act. Utah 
Code Annot. § 48-2c-601. The requirements of the act, in conjunction with the 
~ evidence adduced below, demonstrated that Schvaneveldt was acting in his 
representative capacity, and is not personally liable for the commission. 
Alternatively, Schvaneveldt argued that his tort claims against Shea and Wing 
should be reinstated since the district court ruled that the buyers had waived the 
access issue, thus opening the door for Schvaneveldt to demonstrate that tortious 
conduct by Wing and Shea was the reason the sale failed. Also, Schvaneveldt 
enumerated various other misconduct as a basis for tort claims against Wing and 
c.J . 
Shea. 
Plaintiffs argue in response that denial of summary judgment by the district 
court was proper, because Aspenwood was able to demonstrate that both the FSBO 
and the REPC indicate that Schvaneveldt was acting in a personal, and not 
. .;; repr~sentative, capacity. They also argue that Schvaneveldt failed to raise below 
any argument that Still Standing Stables was liable under the contracts, instead 
13 
inviting his liability by failing to aggressively point to Still Standing as the liable 
party. Plaintiffs also argue that it was the jury, and not the trial court, that 
determined Schvaneveldt's personal liability. This, they argue, heightens the 
standard of review. And even accepting that personal liability was determined as a 
matter of law, Plaintiffs argue that the face of both contracts reflect Schvaneveldt, 
and not Still Standing, as the contracting party. Plaintiffs do not mention in this 
argument the provisions of the LLC Act cited by Schvaneveldt, nor do they 
mention that the FSBO expressly incorporates the seller's disclosures in paragraph 
13. (Those disclosures identify the seller as the LLC, not Schvaneveldt). R. 3716. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Schvaneveldt has failed to show how Shea could have 
caused any harm in tort, as the essential element of causation is missing. There can 
be no causation because Schvaneveldt failed to provide a general warranty deed, 
which, Plaintiffs contend, was the true reason the deal failed. 
b. The Utah Limited Liability Act Conclusively Establishes that 
Schvaneveldt was Acting on Behalf of Still Standing Stables, LLC, 
and not as an Individual. The District Court as a Matter of Law 
Ruled Otherwise, a Decision Reviewed for Correctness. 
The Plaintiffs raise the· issue of what ruling Schvaneveldt is truly appealing. 
A denial of summary judgment is not appealable. Schvaneveldt agrees. He is 
appealing the district court's ruling, as a matter of law, that Schvaneveldt signed 
the REPC in his individual capacity. The district court never specifically issued 
an order using these exact words, but instructed the jury that Schvaneveldt was the 
14 
only person that could be contractually liable for the commission, if a commission 
was indeed due and owing. The jury was presented with the issue that someone 
was liable under the FSBO, and that a commission had been earned, but 
~ Schvaneveldt at that point was the last man standing. R. 5382. This was a ruling 
as a matter of law, reviewed for correctness. 
In the substance of their argument, Plaintiffs focus solely on the contents of 
the REPC and FSBO, with no effort made to rebut the other evidence Schvaneveldt 
raised below indicating that he was acting on behalf of the LLC, 4 and no discussion 
whatsoever of the crucial requirements imposed by the LLC act. That act is 
dispositive. It is especially dispositive in this context, where a district court did not 
apply the act's presumptions (which can be rebutted only by evidence "clearly" 
indicating otherwise, Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 1 40, 190 P.3d 1269), and 
~ instead ruled as a matter of law that a member could be personally liable for an act 
conducted in the name of the LLC. The presumptions of the act render material 
any evidentiary dispute, whether they arise out of the face of the contracts or their 
context. They also place the burden squarely on Plaintiffs to demonstrate personal 
liability (and not the opposite, which is what was imposed by the district court). It 
4 That evidence included Schvaneveldt not being permitted to explain the blank area after 
his name on the REPC followed by the LLC address (suggesting that Shea whited out the 
word "member"). R. 3241. Schvaneveldt also argued below that there were ten other 
unlawful changes made to the REPC after it was signed. Compare R. 3230-34 with R. 
3237-41. 
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was therefore error as a matter of law to conclude that Schvaneveldt was 
personally liable. Such a conclusion fails to follow the act. 
Pl8:intiffs attempt to distinguish Daines, supra p. 15 (cited by Schvaneveldt 
in his brief) to support their position. Their sole contention is that the LLC here 
was not expressly identified as a party to the relevant contracts, whereas in Daines 
there was some mention of the LLC so as to trigger the inference that the LLC was 
the party and not the member signatory. This is a distinction without a difference. 
Schvaneveldt has enumerated the indicia present in both the contracts and other 
evidence to allow the exact same inference as required by both Daines and the 
LLC act. Appellant's Brief pp. 52-53. Plaintiffs ignore these indicia. They then 
further undercut their argument by citing corporate (not LLC) cases that predate 
Daines and do not take into account the express provisions of the LLC act. 
c. Schvaneveldt did Not Fail To Raise Below the Issue of the LLC's 
Liability. 
Plaintiffs contend that Schvaneveldt failed to raise the protections of the 
LLC act at trial by failing below to point to the finger at the LLC. This argument 
proves too much, and actually supports Schvaneveldt' s argument that the district 
court ruled on this issue as a matter of law ( and that it was not somehow resolved 
by the jury). Consistent with its ruling that Schvaneveldt was personally liable as a 
matter of law, the district court prohibited Schvaneveldt from raising the issue of 
whether the LLC was the true contracting party. Schvaneveldt attempted 
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repeatedly to raise the issue of the LLC's party status, and was repeatedly barred 
from doing so by the district court. R. 8383 pp. 12, 20, 28; R. 8385 pp. 27-28; 
Appellant's Brief pp. 50-53; see also Appellant's Brief pp. 18-22. This same 
~ evidence shows that he did not stipulate, as Plaintiffs contend, to dismiss the LLC. 
Rather, he was barred from arguing otherwise. R. 8383 passim. As such, the jury, 
presented with no other option, found Schvaneveldt liable. Consequently, 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Schvaneveldt invited error or failed to raise 
the argument at trial. 
d. If Schvaneveldt is Not Dismiss From This Action, His Tort 
Argunients Should be Alternatively Reinstated. 
Plaintiffs argue that Shea and Wing could not have caused Schvaneveldt any 
· tort damages because Schvaneveldt failed to provide the required general warranty 
deed. Thus, Schvaneveldt was the reason that the sale failed, not Wing or Shea's 
actions. Schvaneveldt has shown, however, that Shea modified the transaction 
documents, and that he was acting as the seller's agent in doing so. This created a 
duty from Shea to Schvaneveldt. Moreover, as has already been argued, supra pp. 
10-12, Schvaneveldt was not obligated to provide a general warranty deed under 
...) the obligations of the REPC. More significantly, Plaintiffs fail to address the fact 
that sellers waived the access issues, a point expressly raised by Schvaneveldt in 
his brief. Pp. 53-54. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his opemng brief, Appellant 
Schvaneveldt respectfully requests that the rulings of the district court on standing, 
liability to pay the commission, and personal liability, be reversed. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2015. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter · 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Attorneys for Appellant Chuck Schvaneveldt 
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